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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
NO. 02-2604
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER RITTER,
Appellant
_________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 98-cr-00131-1)
District Judge: Honorable Herbert J. Hutton
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 25, 2004
Before: RENDELL, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed

March 26, 2004 )
__________
OPINION
__________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Ritter appeals the District Court’s Order denying his habeas corpus
claim (Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct a Sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255). Ritter contends that he was entitled to a hearing on his claim that his

guilty plea was induced by his attorney’s false assurances that his sentence would not
exceed five years. He also contends that his plea to the charge of aiding and abetting
using or carrying a firearm during and in furtherance of a crime of violence was not
knowing and voluntary, and in any event lacks a factual basis. Further, and in response to
the inquiry of a panel of this Court in issuing the Certificate of Appealability, Ritter
suggests that he may be entitled to a remand to the District Court to explore the issue of
waiver and cause and prejudice, although he urges that the government’s failure to raise
the affirmative defense of procedural default below forecloses its consideration on appeal.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and
28 U.S.C. § 2255 and we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.

I.
Ritter was charged with numerous federal criminal offenses based upon a series of
violent robberies and burglaries of residences and businesses in Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, involving a loss to victims of over $1 million in antiques, coins, jewelry, and other
valuables. Ritter, who worked in the antique business, used his knowledge of the
whereabouts and value of goods owned by his associates in the antiques trade and
directed his co-conspirators to these locations, identifying items to steal.
Ritter was indicted with one count of Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, one count of
conspiracy to commit interstate transportation of stolen property, three counts of Hobbs
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Act robbery, one count of using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime,
and three counts of interstate transportation of stolen property. He entered a guilty plea to
all counts. At sentencing, the District Court granted a downward departure pursuant to
section 5K1.1 of the sentencing guidelines, and sentenced Ritter to 196 months’
incarceration, three years’ supervised release, a $900 mandatory special assessment, and
$443,130 in restitution.
In granting the Certificate of Appealability, a motions panel of this Court queried
whether one of Ritter’s issues was procedurally defaulted on direct appeal, and whether
Ritter could overcome such default by demonstrating cause and prejudice. Ritter
contends that it was improper for procedural default to have been raised sua sponte as it
was the government’s obligation to raise and preserve the defense. We decline Ritter’s
invitation to resolve this question because, in any event, it is clear that his underlying
claims lack merit.

II.
Ritter finds fault with the manner in which the District Court rejected his
contention that ineffective assistance of his counsel tainted his guilty plea. In particular,
Ritter argues that the District Court improperly relied upon the plea colloquy, when it
should have considered Ritter’s affidavits and held a hearing at which evidence could be
adduced. Ritter focuses on the fact that, during his colloquy, he understood the guideline
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range before departure, but had been led astray by his counsel as to the effect of the
departure. He further contends that the papers he filed in the District Court demonstrate
that he was assured that his sentence would be no more than five years, based on
downward departures attributable to his plea and cooperation, and other factors.
A district court’s decision to deny a hearing on a § 2255 petition is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir.
1985). Section 2255 provides that a hearing on a defendant’s petition is not required
where “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief.” The District Court here conclusively so found. Ritter
adduced no proof that he was promised or assured of a specific sentence, but, rather, that
counsel gave him his “best estimate” of what sentence might be given if he pled guilty,
namely, five years in prison. The plea agreement and the record of the change of plea
hearing are replete with references to the fact that the District Court would make the
determinations with respect to his sentence under the sentencing guidelines, that the
District Court could decline to follow recommendations, and that no promises had been
made with respect to the sentence that the District Court would impose. The District
Court also advised Ritter that the filing of a § 5K1.1 motion was at the sole discretion of
the government, with the District Court having limited ability to review its refusal to file
such a motion. In addition, the District Court specifically asked Ritter whether anyone
had advised him that the District Court would be lenient at the time of sentencing; Ritter
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responded “no.”
Given the record, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ritter’s
petition for an evidentiary hearing. Whatever counsel had told Ritter, clearly there was no
prejudice because Ritter was fully advised at the time of the taking of the plea that the
District Court was not party to an agreement or promise of any kind.
With respect to Ritter’s contention that his plea to the charge of using or carrying a
firearm during and in furtherance of a crime of violence was not knowing and voluntary,
again, the transcript from the sentencing hearing proves to the contrary. A lengthy
sentencing hearing was held on March 4, 1999, at which Ritter did not advise the District
Court of any promise purportedly made by counsel. And, after the District Court had
imposed the sentence of 196 months, the Court inquired of the defense if there were any
questions, and Ritter had no questions for the Court.
Ritter also attacks the alleged voluntary nature of the plea because he argues it
lacked a factual basis. Rule 11(f) provides that “[n]otwithstanding the acceptance of a
plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment . . . without making such inquiry as
shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R.Crim. P. 11(f) (2001). The
District Court’s finding of a factual basis for a plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502, 509 (3d Cir. 2000). Ritter’s claim is specifically
leveled at the charge of aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in
connection with the home invasion robbery of a coin dealer. We note that Ritter did not
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raise this argument before the trial court, nor on direct appeal. Yet even were it properly
preserved, it has no merit.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), “[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal.” Liability for aiding and abetting requires proof that the underlying crime
occurred and that the defendant knew of that crime and sought to accomplish it. See
United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 (3d Cir. 2002). Mere knowledge of the crime
is not enough; rather, the government must show that the defendant had the specific intent
to facilitate the crime. Id. In Gordon, we held that an aiding and abetting violation of
§ 924(c) does not require that the defendant possessed or controlled the weapon so long
as the defendant’s actions were “sufficiently ‘intertwined with, and his criminal
objectives furthered by’ the actions of the participant who did carry and use the firearm.”
Id. (citing United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 1999)). We have no
difficulty concluding that the record provides a firm basis for Ritter’s aiding and abetting
conviction.

The evidence of Ritter’s knowledge of the violent nature of his associates and that
the robberies were conducted at gunpoint, belies Ritter’s claims that there was no factual
basis for his conviction. Ritter regularly had conversations with these associates after the
commission of their crimes, and was made aware of their modus operandi. Ritter knew
that during these dangerous home invasions, the victims were treated in a violent manner
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and were at times held at gunpoint. There is no question but that Ritter’s actions were
intertwined with and his criminal objectives furthered by his associates who carried and
used a firearm. Given his knowledge that guns were used by his associates and his
specific intent to make the underlying crimes succeed, Ritter’s contention that there was
no basis for his plea to aiding and abetting is remarkable, and unsuccessful.

III.
Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the Order of the District Court.
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